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Despite the instability Syria suffered between its independence in 1946 and its union with Egypt in 
1958, Syrian society was, from the outset, politically and culturally active. Serious attempts were 
made to put down the foundations of the nation State. 
On 8 March 1963, a coup d’état brought the Ba’th party to power. This meant a new State 
authoritarianism, imposed by the regime, which had favoured union with Egypt. Here the country 
entered a totalitarian era. Political life was extinguished to “promote the progress and emancipation 
of the people”1. 
Hafez al-Assad’s arrival into power in 1970 came with promises of economic reform and the 
softening of restrictive policies. But the reality was very different. The following years, in fact, saw 
increasingly authoritarian control of public life. State capitalism was reinforced and vote-catching 
within public machinery mean systematic corruption. The political system framed all societal 
components to its own satisfaction through “people’s organisations”, which are organisms controlling, 
channelling and redistributing privileges.  
Between 1979 and 1982, the country saw peaceful protest and armed violence. These were 
followed by bloody repression. The bloody repression reserved for the armed rebels did not spare 
the disputants.  
When Bachar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000, Syrians began to hope for change. However, 
economic liberation led to harmful consequences at the social level. After the failure of ‘Printemps de 
Damas’(“the Damascus Spring”) in 2001, an opposition alliance was formed in 2005 under the name 
“The Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change”. This alliance wished to promote change through 
dialogue. The authorities’ reaction was to incarcerate the Printemps’ leaders and to close the few 
spaces for national debate which had survived to that time. 
Between legitimacy and revolts  
Numerous Arab regimes saw their absolute domination evaporate with the Arab uprisings that came at 
the end of 2010. Even though most of these regimes were the result of a coup d’état, they had won for 
themselves a certain legitimacy. They had won this legitimacy through participation in the fight for 
independence against the colonial powers, or from confrontation with an external enemy, or even from 
a developmentalist ideology and modernising social policy.  
However, as these regimes began to lose power they became repressive and put in place a 
“securitocratic” system2. According to this logic, civil society was corrupted, becoming simply a 
means of perpetuating power. Furthermore, public expression itself became treasonable. The media 
was, it goes without saying, silenced and became enablers of these at-risk regimes. 
The nature of the legitimacy of power in Syria did not seem so very different to that of other 
regimes. The country had built up “legitimacy” through its fight against Israel and by exploiting 
minorities. Finally, the culture of fear was rooted in a society that had seen thousands of deaths and 
detainees in the 1980s.  
When the dissenting movements in Tunisia began, the Syrian regime did not, at first, sense any 
danger. It failed to understand that in the shadows of a failing economy, systematic corruption and 
inexistent political liberties protest was slowly mounting.  
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In the face of the demands of frustrated populaces, the regime explained the slowness of political 
reforms with reference to the regional situation and to external threats. President Assad3 even declared 
that his country was “sheltered from trouble”, since power was “close to the people”. Moreover, the 
regime spoke of successful economic progress, publishing baseless statistics. The regime did not deign 
to answer appeals, nor did it take the outstretched hands of the opposition to “rebuild confidence and 
build bridges of dialogue”. 
The Syrian exception  
Since the very outbreak of protests in the Arab world in December 2010, observers had not questioned 
“the Syrian exception” and had assumed that the regime would survive. Analysts, in fact, were almost 
unanimous in claiming that the regime benefited from advantages that protected it from these kinds of 
crises. Its geographical position as well as its management of different portfolios at the regional and 
international levels gave it an advantage, according to certain observers. Of course, internal analyses 
were duly given, but they were not taken seriously and their role in the coming protests was 
underestimated. After all, there had been decades of stagnation and “stability”.  
However, now fear, which had taken hold of Syrian society, switched sides. The protest 
movements had begun with small, limited gatherings in February 2011. Young people expressed their 
anger at specific incidents. This was notably the case in the demonstration of young people within the 
old town of Damascus, with its slogan “Syrians will not be humiliated!” during which, one of the 
protestors was harassed by a police officer. The Minister of Interior went to meet the protestors, 
criticising them: “Have you no shame? This is a protest, you know!” It was impossible for power to 
admit that the young might express their worries, needs and anger.  
On 18 March, in the southern town of Daraa, school children were arrested and tortured for having 
dared to write “down with the regime” on the walls of their school, words that had not ceased to be 
heard on the television from protests in Tunis and Cairo. Underground protests suddenly became 
massive movements. From this date onwards, protests spread through much of the country.  
Given the new situation, the opposition demanded that the authorities assume “their responsibilities 
[…] and adopt an audacious and wise position with respect to the question of democratic transition […], 
through the voice of national dialogue […]”. To make this dialogue possible, the Damascus Declaration 
demanded the liberation of political prisoners, the abrogation of emergency laws and the respect of rights 
to public freedom and association. The regime’s response was quick and violent. The demonstrations 
were denounced and the demonstrators were accused of being manipulated by Syria’s “enemies”. 
After a period of confusion, the Syrian president delivered two speeches that did not respond to the 
expectations of the disputants, who were thirsty for reforms and freedom. In fact, their regional and 
international political supporters, such as Turkey, Qatar and France, saw their attempts at mediation 
haughtily spurned.  
The dissenting movement adopted the same tools, slogans and procedures as the previous 
dissenting movements in Tunisia and Egypt. Social networks played an important role in the absence 
of neutral media coverage. The international press was removed. Any “corrective” operations needed 
to take place out of the sight of the world. 
National unity has been put first by protestors to avoid a dangerous confessional dimension in a 
minority-rich society. The protestors’ slogan “God, Syria and freedom, that is all” was shouted in 
answer to the regime’s “God, Syria and Bachar, that is all”. This effectively translates the desire to 
take up freedom in the face of the durability of the system and its symbols. 
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At the beginning of the people’s uprising, the demands were “measures” and they were linked to 
the need for gradual democratisation. The protestors did not cease to reaffirm that the desire for a free 
life was about Syria: it did not depend on the wishes of foreign powers.  
The desire for dialogue with the regime was a genuine one. In fact, the opposition and independent 
intellectuals had proposed several points. But the regime was obstinate and securitarian and military 
abuses of power were preferred and the risk of the community base cracking up increased. 
Syrians, who did not fear national division, organised themselves to assure a peaceful and 
progressive transition in the hope that violence would cease. They are convinced that their future is 
linked to the unity of the country and to a democratic and secular State. Admittedly this last point – the 
secular state – risks splitting the different belligerents. But this problem will be resolved in a national 
framework of dialogue and reciprocal concessions. Syrian history has long been about the peaceful 
coexistence of different religious communities.  
It became commonplace to say that in Syria there is no opposition only opponents. Everyone 
questions whether there is the political organisation to guarantee a transition should Bachar al Assad 
leave. Here is something that worries not only observers, but also a large part of Syrian society. 
However, any fear is based on a misunderstanding of the protest movement. There are links between 
the various communities, demonstrating this country’s ability to take control.  
The refugees of freedom  
The repressive management of the crisis resulted in the emergence of armed opposition five months 
after it had begun. First, this resulted in numerous withdrawals as the Syrian army committed 
atrocities. The armed resistance was then reinforced by thousands of civilians, who took up weapons 
in order to defend their families and belongings or to avenge the fallen, victims to the regime’s 
military and securitarian machine.  
The armed repression of peaceful disputes and the militarisation of the resistance have contributed 
to a massive exodus from targeted towns. This exodus has taken several forms, depending on the 
resources of the victims. Thousands of civilians living in the border regions sought refuge in Turkey, 
Jordan, Libya and Iraq. We have also seen the departure of thousands upon thousands of individuals 
towards Cyprus from along the Syrian coast. These first refugees came from the regions most affected 
by the massive bombing and the arbitrary incursions of loyalist forces. In fact, millions of people were 
obliged to leave of their district or town. 
With regard to departures from the country, the regional situation of the Syrian refugees came to 
depend on the problems of the host country.  
In Lebanon, there were Syrian tensions between pro and anti-Assad forces. This phenomenon was 
amplified by the already unstable Lebanese political alliances and the economic, social and 
securitarian impact of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon more generally.  
The presence of refugees represents a securitarian challenge. Indeed, militias close to the Syrian 
regime try to intimidate or even terrorise these refugees, notably those who are politically active. The 
control of paramilitary forces outside the State machine also help to impose rules on Syrians exiled in 
Lebanon.  
Numerous refugees find themselves in a precarious situation with little or no financial resources. 
Lebanon, which is officially neutral, refuses to set up refugee camps and sometimes pushes Syrian 
immigrants back across the border. This has naturally provoked outrage on the part of NGOs. 
The Lebanese government has avoided setting up official camps, but that does not prevent 
clandestine camps, which give rise to a new form of exploitation; a tent is sold for between 300 and 
700 dollars or rented for 200 dollars a month.  
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There is solidarity, but this only comes out at the community level. The risk of this humanitarian 
crisis being exploited is real in Lebanon. 
Unlike Lebanon, Jordan, with about 100,000 Syrian refugees, has set up camps in the desert. A 
large proportion of these refugees are based in the Zaatari camp. The life conditions there are poor. 
Furthermore, Jordan’s capacity to host a refugee population is modest and the country is no longer 
able to give appropriate aid to the refugees. The economic crisis and general political instability play a 
negative role in the humanitarian aspect of the crisis. This means internal tensions within the country.  
Syrian refugees are also scattered through Jordanian towns, which has a negative effect on an 
Jordan’s already weak economy. The Jordanian government has used the crisis as a “bargaining tool” 
to request more international aid. An assisted economy like that of Jordan will inevitably exploit the 
situation in the refugee camps in order to launch aid appeals. Also, the increase in fruit and vegetable 
prices between July 2010 and July 2011 was connected to the arrival of refugees, according to the 
central statistics office in Amman4. It should also be noted that Jordanian leaders do not act on the 
global increase in prices, something compounded by poor local management. High prices are the result 
of the export of Jordanian products towards the Gulf and Iraq and the absence of Syrian products. 
In Turkey, c. 175,000 Syrian refugees are hosted mainly in the provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep, 
Kilis and Urfa in camps. The Turkish government has apparently assumed responsibility for their 
assistance, shelter and protection. The frontier posts were provisionally closed by Ankara: a signal to 
the international community that too many had crossed the border. Syrians, indeed, found themselves 
blocked at the border before being able to pass through. Turkey also talks of setting up a buffer zone to 
allow for refugees to be looked after on Syrian territory.  
For the Turkish government, the situation is further complicated by regional politics within the 
country. In the region of Hatay, which is mainly inhabited by Alevies, there is strong prejudice against 
the refugees. The Alevies accuse the central government of wanting to change the demographic 
composition by implanting “Sunnites/Syrians” on “their” ground. It was shocking to see during the 
hostile demonstrations there three juxtaposed portraits: Ali, the cousin of the Prophet, Kamal Atatürk 
and Bachar al-Assad. And this despite the welcome policy advocated by the AKP.  
The government allowed only one humanitarian Turkish association to be active in the camps: the 
HHK, a group which is close to the AKP. Despite the good humanitarian work of this association this 
organisation is essentially religious. Indeed, being close to the conservative tradition, it took advantage 
of its privileged position to spread religious teachings among the refugees.  
With the worsening humanitarian situation and with more refugees arriving in Turkey, the 
Turkish government has now opened the field to different national and international organisations 
with relative restrictions.  
In addition to the exile of disadvantaged people to the camps and the middle class to the city, it 
should be noted that tens of thousands of Syrians have fled to distant countries using their resources or 
their savings. Europe has received thousands of Syrians, including activists. In Egypt, the number of 
Syrians in the Cairo area is estimated to be 100,000. 
The figures vary for the number of refugees in the different countries. The UN authorities or 
humanitarian organisations talk of registered refugees. However, thousands of Syrian refugees do 
not register themselves because of ignorance or fear. In fact, some Syrians avoid initiating a 
registration procedure that seems very complicated and bureaucratic to them. UN organisations give 
estimates5 thanks to the existence of established camps under their authority and visits by their 
representatives. But other charitable organisations offer estimates that are twice as high: for 
example, Caritas in the case of Lebanon6. 
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Displaced Syrians and refugees: what is their future? 
Alongside the hundreds of thousands of refugees that flee abroad, there are also many internal exiles 
in Syria itself. The majority of displaced people inside Syria are today found in the regions of 
Damascus, Alep, Homs, Deir Ez-Zor and Idlib. The numbers go up and up. We can talk of at least 5 
million displaced across the country: an enormous number when it is remembered that Syria had a pre-
revolt population of some 23 million. 
Given the extreme violence worked against the civil population, which have seen the destruction of 
houses and food and water provisions, today there are three forms of interior displacement:  
 Families that have been able to find accommodation with friends or relatives. 
 Families that have free or paid individual accommodation. These lodgings are often 
unsanitary. It is common to find several families living together. 
 Families who are living out of schools and public buildings. 
It is important to note that many families have been displaced several times. 
There are naturally consequences in terms of health and education, which particularly affect children. 
The main consequence of violent displacement is the disintegration of family structures. Part of this 
relates to the increase in violence within families resulting from proximity, tensions, anxieties and the 
violence endured by adults. 
In the two situations, that of the refugees in camps outside the country and that of displaced people 
inside the country, children evidently have the same basic needs as adults regarding security, health 
and nutrition. But children also have other special needs, which are worth stressing. We can classify 
their needs into four categories: 
 Medical needs: displacement, lack of hygiene, malnutrition, poor health levels in their 
temporary homes and stress linked to violence are all direct causes of numerous illnesses. 
Infants are particularly affected by stress and malnutrition from the mother during and after 
pregnancy. Finally, children should be the object of a vaccination campaign for the most 
common illnesses. 
 Nutritional needs: the major difficulty is in obtaining sufficient quantities of milk for 
babies, which is adapted to the large number of very young children. This kind of milk is 
evidently more expensive than ordinary milk or bread, which efficiently nourishes a lot of 
older children.  
 Schooling needs: an important proportion of Syrian children went without education 
following the outbreak of war, either because schools hosted displaced people and their 
teachers had left, or because of displacement(s). Some schools were set up in the camps, but 
with little funding and with a chronic lack of teachers.  
 Psychological needs: these needs are the ones least taken into account. Yet all areas affected 
by violence, report the psychological distress of children. Common symptoms include: 
incontinence, fear, and repeated crying attacks. In addition, amongst the hundreds of raped 
adolescents, a certain number of young girls find themselves pregnant at 14 or 15 years of age. 
Children, given the poverty of their families, either start begging, or look for all sorts of small jobs. 
All too often they are driven to minor acts of delinquency and then criminality. 
The regime, considers that the displaced form part of the population which dared to contest its 
absolute power. It, therefore, prevents emergency aid from getting through. No NGO installed in Syria 
can distribute aid without authorisation, and the regime determines in which region and by whom this 
aid must be distributed. The regions chosen are evidently not those where refugees are found. 
Therefore, the regime exploits international aid to build up a client base to which it delivers 
emergency aid meant for refugees. 
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Observers estimate that 80% of international aid and, more specifically, aid brought by the Red 
Cross, is wasted through corruption and political instrumentalisation. This takes place through the 
direction of the Syrian Red Crescent (RC), which is not properly neutral. The Syrian RC agents who wish 
to conform to their mission are constrained to do so clandestinely.  
Consequently, displaced people do not have any confidence in emergency aid organisations 
patronised by the regime. The western NGOs that want to help displaced Syrians effectively have to 
make contact with informal networks and support associations. Today, this is the only way to pass on 
aid. These are the weak local partners that send aid directly from various support committees.  
The situation has now evolved due to shortages in medicine and milk for children. Shortages are 
due to the closure or the destruction of the relevant factories and businesses. Aid for the disabled has 
become equally problematic.  
The relentless repression against doctors providing care to displaced people or caring for the 
injured has considerably reduced the number of medical professionals available. And when there are 
doctors, all too often medicine is lacking.  
The shared life imposed by the displacement and exile of thousands upon thousands of families 
raises the question of cohabitation for people from many different backgrounds: rural and city-
dwellers, Turcoman, Kurds and Arabs. 
Finally, the experiences of displaced people and the management of humanitarian aid have created 
dynamics that will have unpredictable consequences for the country: the emergence and empowerment 
of civil society; cross-community solidarity, even though ethnic and community fragmentation, 
encouraged by the regime are also evident; a better understanding of “otherness” (in terms of Syrian 
citizenship) and the notion of shared space; family re-composition and the slow modification of 
relations between men and women; not to mention deep disruption in the education system at all 
levels. And last but not least there is the desperate need to respond to the psychological traumas that 
affect the majority of Syrians, and especially the most vulnerable: Syrian children. 
What perspectives and what hopes? 
Given the closure of the Syrian political system and the repression that has been the lot of political 
activists for decades, there are a significant number of Syrian opponents abroad from many different 
backgrounds. Hoping for the end of the dictatorship, several attempts to regroup have taken place to 
prepare Syria for a new future.  
There are political but also more concrete initiatives. Technocrats, technicians, scientists from all 
disciplines, businessmen and bankers organise meetings to develop plans for the Syria of 
tomorrow
7
. These actors try to develop concrete projects so that they will be able to help reconstruct 
Syria when the regime finally collapses. In fact, efforts to set up truth commissions in the framework 
of transitional justice should reassure a large number of Syrians and help circumvent any desire for 
rough justice. 
The only positive thing to do in the present period of waiting is to use the time available to prepare 
for the future.  
Through almost 20 months of uprising, the regime of Bacher Al Assad has persisted. However, the 
rebellion does not weaken either. The result? The country is dragged towards civil war. The efforts of the 
regime in trying to bring about this civil war are there for all to see. The regime has used every means at 
its disposal. Consequently, the social fabric is threatened: though so far it has proved resistant. Social 
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communitarianism has long been present in Syria and it has never been a source of conflict. However, 
political power has exploited religion since the 1970s and has taken minorities hostage. 
The divisive discourse that accompanies repression risks seeping down into society. Political and 
social efforts are necessary to prevent any such thing from happening. There is a real danger that 
otherwise Syria will experience this kind of conflict. It is desperately important to break free from the 
logic of reaction to provoke action.  
The regime was brought into being to manage just such a situation. Indeed, fear within the 
managerial class plays an important role in preventing the system’s final collapse. Furthermore, it is 
important to underline that the regime has succeeded in elevating and supplying certain groups over 
the decades by distributing privileges and allowing profitable corruption.  
On the other hand, political projects proposed by the Syrian opposition have not completely 
succeeded in reassuring society’s “silent” party. This is not a question of power. There is thoughthe 
fear of instability and of the unknown, while the alternative project drags its feet. 
The regional and international dimension adds to the complexity of this situation. The role of 
Russia and Iran is crucial in maintaining the status quo. Indeed, foreign intervention from Iran and 
Russia consolidate the regime, which continues in its securitarian policy and its bloody practices.  
The Russians negotiate their portfolios at the price of new Syrian victims. They consider 
themselves to have been mistreated on the international scene since the collapse of the Soviet bloc. For 
them, it is time to erase the humiliation. Then also, two essential factors emerge from the Arab revolt 
in general: political Islam and democracy. They both present a source of fear for Russia, with its sham 
democracy and its 25% Muslim population.  
The outcome of the crisis in Syria will depend on civil resistance and political mobilisation. The 
Syrians are showing their ability to resist. The involuntary militarisation provoked by bloody repression 
has civilian and peaceful roots. Increasing help for the resistance movement, which is more and more 
important amongst those who initially held back, has been noticed. However, the political opposition had 
consumed a lot of energy in its internal conflicts and in the selfishness of some of its figures.  
Several decades without political life or culture, the exile and imprisonment of activists, the 
development of a suspicious culture and distrust within society in general and with opponents in 
particular, are factors that do not favour the creation of an efficient and united opposition. However, it 
is also normal that political and tactical divergences find their place in any authority that works for its 
country’s “democratic” future.  
The creation of a Syrian National Coalition for the Revolution and Opposition in November 
2012 allowed the political opposition to become more efficient. Such a project will contribute to 
consolidating the Syrians’ position and will allow them to have a future without confrontations 
and repression. 
For a long time, Syrians have very much counted on the international community The 
disillusionment felt at present is very strong and it has led to resignation and indifference. International 
civil societies can compensate the gap left by the absence of political decision-making. The Syrians 
have proven their ability to resist. The different forms of resistance that they have been able to 
“invent” over the last 20 months will allow them to consolidate. It is also important to count on their 
political and societal conscience in order to avoid the communitarian conflict, which the regime has 
worked so hard to bring about. 
There is a strong national conscience within the dissenting movement: certainly, all peaceful 
demonstrations are in favour of national unity. However, it is clear that the fear of sectarian division is 
gaining ground. This has been brought about quite transparently by the regime and means that those 
religious leaders, who produce a unifying discourse to reassure the other communities, are silenced.  
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This dangerous game on the part of the authorities sows doubt in the “silent minority”, despite the 
relentless attempts by the opposition to try to explain this exploitation of religious differences and to 
alert society to the danger of such manipulation. This manipulation, which tries to label the dissenting 
movement as “Salafism Jihadism”, sometimes succeeds in winning over hesitant spirits in Syrian 
society. It also succeeds, at times, in the diplomatic circles of certain western chancelleries.  
Among the many challenges that Syria faces in the near future, there is the danger that a war 
against civilians will become a civil war. The regime, with the active or passive complicity of the 
international “community”, favours this inversion, which would take the country towards a more 
complex and more uncertain future. To avoid such a situation, civil society is systematically 
strengthening itself before the hoped for change. 
A second challenge stems from the catastrophic humanitarian situation, which has not yet woken 
the sleepy international conscience. Declarations and good intentions do not feed the starving and they 
do not shelter refugees. The harmful consequences of such a situation risk having very profound 
impacts on Syrian society, as well as on neighbouring countries.  
By the end of this “crisis”, the economic situation in Syria will have reached catastrophic levels 
with problems at the level of human security. Consequently, a “Marshal plan” is necessary and it 
must depend, above all, on the Syrian Diaspora, already engaged in humanitarian aid, as well as on 
foreign donors.  
The democratic transition will need to overcome five decades of the total absence of political 
practice. The transition must too replace the culture of fear with citizen engagement. Syrians will be 
able to concretise the end of the dictatorship which will be decisive in terms of the democratic process 
in the years to come. 
The reconstruction of the social fabric, which has been methodically ripped, will need meticulous 
work within an emerging civil society. The economy, which has been despoiled and corrupted over the 
decades, will need rigorous reconstruction. To do so, it is necessary to reassure society by applying 
efficient transitional justice, with a series of reforms in, inter alia, justice, security and the armed forces.  
International relations do not work according to the logic of charity and moral principles. However, 
the help of rich countries (not to mention the international “community”, which is a harebrained 
concept) in reconstructing civil society will be inevitable. These countries should invest in the 
reconstruction of a devastated Syria, not least to make amends for their present indifference. 
